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Summary
This report describes the Total Information Awareness (TIA) programs in the
Defense Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the Department of Defense, and
related information access, collection, and protection laws.  TIA is a new technology
under development that plans to use data mining technologies to sift through personal
transactions in electronic data to find patterns and associations connected to terrorist
threats and activities.  Data mining technologies are currently used by federal
agencies for various purposes.  DARPA has underway a five year research project to
develop and integrate information technologies into prototype systems to identify
foreign terrorists for use by the intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement,
and homeland security communities.  Recent increased awareness about the existence
of the TIA project provoked expressions of concern about the potential for the
invasion of privacy of law-abiding citizens by the Government, and about the
direction of the project by John Poindexter, a central figure in the Iran-Contra affair.
While the law enforcement and intelligence communities argue that more
sophisticated information gathering techniques are essential to combat today’s
sophisticated terrorists, civil libertarians worry that the Government’s increased
capability to assemble information will result in increased and unchecked
government power, and the erosion of individual privacy.  A coalition of public
interest groups has asked Congress to intervene.
Significant policy and legal issues are raised by the government’s TIA plans.
Chief among them are privacy issues involving questions of access to, and use and
disclosure of personal information by the federal government.  This report describes
current laws and safeguards to protect the privacy of personal information, the
required legal process for officials who seek access to information, and the provisions
currently in place that permit access and dissemination of information for law
enforcement, intelligence, and terrorism purposes.  Federal laws currently protect
government, credit, communications, education, bank, cable, video, motor vehicle,
health, telecommunications, children’s, and financial information; generally carve out
exceptions for disclosure of personal information; and authorize use of warrants,
subpoenas, and court orders to obtain information. 
Some Members of Congress seek additional Congressional oversight of TIA
programs.  Legislation has been introduced in the 108th Congress regulating TIA
programs.  On January 23, 2003, the Senate passed  amendment S.Amdt. 59 to
H.J.Res. 2, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, imposing
limitations on the unfolding Total Information Awareness programs, and requiring
a detailed report to Congress.  On February 13, 2003, both the House and Senate
approved the Fiscal Year 2003 omnibus spending bill (P.L. 108-7) including, with
slight modifications, the language from S.Amdt. 59.  For more information, see CRS
Report RL31786,  Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Oversight and
Composition Issues by Amy Belasco; and CRS Report RL31798, Data Mining: An
Overview, by Jeffrey Seifert.  This report will be updated as warranted.
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1 The Total Information Awareness program will integrate some or all of the R&D efforts
that are managed by the Information Awareness Office, including Project Genoa, Project
Genoa II, Genisys, Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery, Wargaming the Asymmetric
Environment, Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization, Human
Identification at a Distance, Bio-Surveillance, Communicator, and Babylon, as well as
possibly other R&D developed by DARPA, DOD, other federal agencies, and the private
sector.  See CRS  Report RL31786, Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding,
Oversight and Composition Issues, by Amy Belasco.
2 See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Information Awareness Office and
Total Information Awareness Project at  [http://www.darpa.mil/iao/programs.htm].
3  [http://www.darpa.mil/iao/TIASystems.htm].
Privacy: Total Information Awareness
Programs and Related Information Access,
Collection, and Protection Laws
Total Information Awareness Programs
The September 11th terrorist attacks increased government awareness of the
inadequacies of its information gathering techniques, its information technology, and
its information holdings. To remedy this situation various federal agencies are
addressing issues that may possibly have a direct bearing on the balance between the
government’s need for information and an individual’s expectation of privacy in their
information.  This report describes the Total Information Awareness (TIA) programs
underway in the Department of Defense (DOD) which may develop prototype
research and development technologies for information gathering and analysis
capabilities that could be used by DOD and other agencies.  It will then discuss
current laws and safeguards to protect the privacy of personal information, the
provisions currently in place that permit access and dissemination of information for
law enforcement, intelligence, and terrorism purposes, and the required legal process
for officials who seek access to information.
The TIA program is being developed by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) of the Department of Defense in the Information
Awareness Office (IAO)1 as an experimental prototype system that integrates three
types of technologies — machine translation of languages; data search and pattern
recognition; and advanced collaborative and decision support.2   DARPA “aspires to
create the tools that would permit analysts to data-mine an indefinitely expandable
universe of databases” “to analyze,  detect, classify and identify foreign terrorists –
and decipher their plans – and thereby enable the U.S. to take timely action to
successfully preempt and defeat terrorist acts.”3  The TIA system is designed to be
a tool in the war against terrorism that “would, among other things, help analysts
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4  Robert O’Harrow, U.S. Hopes to Check Computers Globally; System Would Be Used to





9 See John Woodward, Jr., Rand Corporation, Superbowl Surveillance: Facing Up to
Biometrics (2001) available at [http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP209/IP209.pdf].
10 Solicitations, supra note 8.
11 See CRS Report RL31798, Data Mining: An Overview, by Jeffrey Seifert.
12 [http://www.darpa.mil/DARPATech2002/presentations/iao_pdf/speeches/POINDEXT.
search randomly for indications of travel to risky areas, suspicious emails, odd fund
transfers and improbable medical activity, such as the treatments of anthrax sores.”4
The goal of the TIA program is “to create a counter-terrorism information system
that:  (i) increases the information coverage . . . ; (ii) provides focused warnings
within an hour after a triggering event occurs or an evidence threshold is passed;
[and] (iii) can automatically cue analysts based on partial pattern matches and
analytical reasoning, and information sharing . . . .”5  DARPA’s five year research
project to develop and integrate information technologies into a prototype system for
use by the intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement communities intends
to exploit R&D efforts that have been underway for several years in DARPA and
elsewhere, as well as private sector data mining technology.6
DARPA envisions a database “of an unprecedented scale, [that] will most likely
be distributed, must be capable of being continuously updated, and must support both
autonomous and semi-automated analysis.”7  Extensive existing databases from both
private and public sector information holdings will be used to obtain transactional
and biometric data.8  Transactional data for the TIA database could include financial
(e.g., banks, credit cards, and money transmitters, casinos and brokerage firms),
educational, travel (e.g., airlines, rail, rental car), medical, veterinary, country entry,
place/event entry, transportation, housing, critical resources, government, and
communications (e.g., cell, landline, Internet) data.  Biometric data for the database
could include face, finger prints, gait, and iris data.9  The TIA system could seek
access to databases to discover connections between “passports; visas; work permits;
driver’s license; credit card; airline tickets; rental cars; gun purchases; chemical
purchases – and events – such as arrest or suspicious activities and so forth.”10
Data Mining
A key component of the TIA program is the deployment of data mining
technologies to sift through data and transactions to find patterns and associations to
discover and track terrorists.11  The idea is that “if terrorist organizations are going
to plan and execute attacks against the United States, their people must engage in




13 Carol Pickering, They’re Watching You: Data-Mining Firms Are Watching Your Every
Move – and Predicting the Next One, Business 2.0 (Feb. 2000) at
[http://www.business2.com].
14 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau Diffie, Privacy on the line: the Politics of Wiretapping
and Encryption at119 (1998).
15 The White House Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland
Security at 39 (July 2002) at  [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html].
16 Section 307 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264, 110 Stat.
3253) directed FAA to assist airlines in developing a computer-assisted passenger profiling
system in conjunction with other security measures and technologies. See
[http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/02-27-02/02-27-02memo.html].
17 Supra note 14.
18 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html].
plans to mine transaction data for terrorism-related indicators to uncover terrorists
plans or attacks.  Data mining is the search for significant patterns and trends in large
databases using sophisticated statistical techniques and software.13  The widespread
use of computers, and the large amount of information maintained in databases
means that there exists a vast repository of information  useful for antiterrorism
purposes.  Today, “it is a rare person in the modern world who can avoid being listed
in numerous databases.”14  Data mining technologies facilitate the use of
information.
Data mining technologies are currently used by federal agencies for various
purposes, and plans exist for considerable expansion of this technology.  For
example, the Department of Justice is engaged in data mining projects that utilize
computer technology to analyze information to reveal patterns of behavior consistent
with terrorist activities. Utilizing law enforcement and intelligence information as
well as public source data, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force employs risk
modeling algorithms, link analysis, historic review of past patterns of behavior, and
other factors to distinguish persons who may pose a risk of terrorism from those who
do not.15 The Transportation Security Administration’s Computer- Assisted
Passenger Profiling System is widely employed by the airlines.16  The National
Strategy for Homeland Security includes several initiatives to integrate terrorist-
related information from the databases of all government agencies responsible for
homeland security.  Under this initiative, the Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Justice, FBI, and numerous state and local law enforcement agencies
would have access to information analysis, using advanced data-mining techniques
to reveal patterns of criminal behavior and detain suspected terrorists before they
act.17  Additionally, on January 28, 2003 President Bush proposed to establish a new
Terrorism Threat and Integration Center to merge and analyze terrorist-related
information collected domestically and abroad.18
DOD recently announced plans to form an internal TIA oversight board to
establish policies and procedures for use of TIA within and outside of DoD, and to
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19 Available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/t02072003_t0207atl.html].
20 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age recently
proposed guidelines to allow the effective use of information (including the use of data
mining technologies) in the war against terrorism while respecting individuals’ interests in
the use of private information.  The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in
the Information, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age at 32 - 34 (October
2002) at [http://www.markle.org/news/NSTF_Part_1.pdf].
21 Glenn R. Simpson, “Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get The Goods on You, It
May Ask ChoicePoint — U.S. Agencies’ Growing Use Of Outside Data Suppliers Raises
Privacy Concerns” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2001 (The company “specialize[s] in
doing what the law discourages the government from doing on its own– culling, sorting and
packaging data on individuals from scores of sources, including credit bureaus, marketers
and regulatory agencies.”)
establish an external federal advisory committee to advise the secretary of Defense
on policy and legal issues raised by TIA technologies.19
Legal Issues
Government access to and mining of information on individuals held in a
multiplicity of databases, public and private, raises a plethora of issues – both legal
and policy.  To what extent should the government be able to gather and mine
information about individuals to aid the war against terrorism?20  Should unrestricted
access to personal information be permitted?  Should limitations, if any, be imposed
on the government’s access to information?  In resolving these issues, the current
state of the law in this area may be consulted.  The rest of this report describes
current laws and safeguards to protect the privacy of personal information, the
required legal process for officials who seek access to information, and the provisions
currently in place that permit access and dissemination of information for law
enforcement and intelligence gathering purposes.  Following is a description of
selected information access, collection, and disclosure laws and regulations.
Federal Laws Governing Federal Government Access to
Information
Generally there are no blanket prohibitions on federal government access to
publicly available information (e.g., real property records, liens, mortgages, etc.).
Occasionally a statute will specifically authorize access to such data.  The USA
PATRIOT Act, for example, in transforming the Treasury Department’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) from an administratively established bureau
to one established by statute, specified that it was to provide government-wide
access to information collected under the anti-money laundering laws, records
maintained by other government offices, as well as privately and publicly held
information.  Other government agencies have also availed themselves of computer
software products that provide access to a range of personal information.  The FBI
reportedly purchases personal information from ChoicePoint Inc, a provider of
identification and credential verification services, for data analysis.21
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22 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
23  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
24 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
25 Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977).
As previously discussed the federal government seeks access to publicly and
privately held databases in order to build a centralized database to detect and deter
against terrorist threats and attacks.  This section of the report describes existing legal
safeguards for the protection of personal information. It covers applicable federal
laws; a discussion of state laws is beyond its scope.  In the United States there is no
omnibus statute or constitutional provision that provides comprehensive legal
protection for the privacy of personal information, but rather an assortment of laws
regulate information deemed to be of sufficient importance to be afforded some level
of protection.  The U.S. Constitution, federal statutes and regulations, and state law
combine to govern the collection, use, and disclosure of information.  The
Constitution provides certain privacy protections, but does not explicitly protect
information privacy.22  Its protections extend only to the protection of the individual
against government intrusions, and its  guarantees are not applicable unless “state
action” has taken place.   In other words its guarantees extend to government
intrusions rather than private sector abuses.  The Fourth Amendment search-and-
seizure provision protects a right of privacy by requiring warrants before government
may invade one’s internal space or by requiring that warrantless invasions be
reasonable.23  That amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion.  The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as
imposing a warrant requirement on all searches and seizures predicated upon
governmental authority, and has ruled that violations of this standard will result in
the suppression in any criminal proceeding of any material or information derived
therefrom.  The Court has also recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Finally, an individual has no Fourth Amendment rights with respect to information
held by third parties.24
There is no comprehensive federal statute that protects the privacy of personal
information held by the public sector and the private sector. Instead federal law tends
to employ a sectoral approach to the regulation of personal information.  Historically,
the individual’s privacy interests have been balanced with the government’s
information needs.25  Examples of this balancing of personal and governmental
interests can be found in the numerous privacy-related enactments of the past twenty-
five years.  Federal laws protect government, credit, communications, education,
bank, cable, video, motor vehicle, health, telecommunications, children’s, and
financial information.  These laws generally carve out exceptions for the disclosure
of personally identifiable information to law enforcement officials, and authorize
access to personal information through use of search warrants, subpoenas, and court
orders.  Notice requirements vary according to statute.
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26 32 CFR Part 109.
27 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j).
28 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 1 of the FOIA protects from disclosure national security
information concerning the national defense or foreign policy, provided that it has been
properly classified in accordance with the requirements of an executive order.
29 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
30 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
31 Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Implementing Section 552a of Title 5,
(continued...)
Federal Government Information.
The Privacy Act.  The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, was
implemented to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems
maintained by federal executive branch agencies, and to control the collection, use,
and sharing of  information.  The Act restricts disclosure of personally identifiable
records maintained by agencies; grants individuals increased rights of access to
agency records maintained on themselves; grants individuals the right to seek
amendment of agency records maintained on themselves upon a showing that the
records are not accurate, relevant, timely or complete; and establishes a code of “fair
information practices” which requires agencies to comply with statutory norms for
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of records.
The general exemptions of the Privacy Act, which are agency and function-
oriented, permit the Central Intelligence Agency26 and federal criminal law
enforcement agencies to exempt certain systems of records from some of the Act’s
requirements.27  The general exemption for the CIA covers all of its files. The general
exemption for federal criminal law enforcement agencies covers identification
information, criminal investigative materials, and reports compiled between the
stages of arrest and release from criminal agency supervision.  An agency which has
law enforcement, prosecution, or probation activities can use this general exemption.
In addition specific exemptions permit an agency to exempt a system of records from
specified Privacy Act requirements if the system of records is:  national security
information which would be protected from mandatory disclosure by FOIA;28 law
enforcement material which falls outside the criminal law enforcement general
exemption; Secret Service files; Census material and other matter required by law to
be kept only as a statistical record; confidential sources of government background
investigation information; test materials of the civil service selection and promotion
process; and confidential evaluations of military and naval personnel.29
The general disclosure rule under the Privacy Act is that unless a statutory
exception applies, no federal executive branch agency shall disclose any record
which is contained in a system of records to any person or to another agency except
pursuant to a written request by, or with prior written consent of the individual to
whom the record pertains.30  Disclosure includes dissemination within the executive
branch from one agency to another or from one large segment of an agency to another




32 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
33 See Sean Fogarty and Daniel R. Ortiz, “Limitations Upon Interagency Information
Sharing: The Privacy Act of 1974" in The Markle Foundation Task Force Report, National
Security in the Information Age at 127 - 132 (October 2002).
34 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).  The OMB guidelines state that the “compatibility” concept
encompasses functionality equivalent uses, and other uses that are necessary and proper.
35 Records in the system include passenger name records (PNRs) and associated data;
reservation and manifest information of passenger carriers and, in the case of individuals
who are deemed to pose a possible risk to transportation security, record categories may
include: risk assessment reports; financial and transactional data; public source information;
proprietary data; and information from law enforcement and intelligence sources.  Data are
retrievable by the name or other identifying information of the individual, such as flight
information.  Information may be disclosed from this system as follows (routine uses of
records): (1) to appropriate Federal, State, territorial, tribal, local, international, or foreign
agencies responsible for investigating or prosecuting the violations of, or for enforcing or
implementing, a statute, rule, regulation, order, or license, . . . . (2) to contractors, grantees,
experts, consultants, agents and other non-Federal employees performing or working on a
contract, service, grant, cooperative agreement, or other assignment from the Federal
government for the purpose of providing consulting, data processing, clerical, or other
functions to assist TSA . . . . (3) to Federal, State, territorial, tribal, and local law
enforcement and regulatory agencies–foreign, international, and domestic–in response to
queries regarding persons who may pose a risk to transportation or national security; a risk
of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety; or a threat to aviation
safety, civil aviation, or national security. (4) to individuals and organizations, in the course
of enforcement efforts, to the extent necessary to elicit information pertinent to the
investigation, prosecution, or enforcement of civil or criminal statutes, rules, regulations or
orders regarding persons who may pose a risk to transportation or national security; a risk
of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety; or a threat to aviation
safety, civil aviation, or national security. (5) to a Federal, State, or local agency, where such
(continued...)
collected by one agency with other agencies for purposes other than for which it was
originally collected.  In reality, though, the Act’s many exemptions and exceptions
ease this prohibition.  Many of the exceptions – as well as specific laws authorizing
sharing of records – permit an agency to disclose or share personal information with
other agencies.32
Several of the statutory exemptions are relevant to the information collection
and sharing activities of the Total Information Awareness system, and would appear
to authorize the disclosure of personal information in federal records systems without
the individual’s consent.33  The routine use exemption allows an agency to share,
without consent, an individual’s personal information with other agencies if that
sharing is listed as a routine use for that agency in the Federal Register and is
compatible with the purpose of the initial information gathering.34  The January 2003
publication by the Transportation Security Administration of a notice to amend the
“Aviation Security Screening Records” system of records illustrates how broadly
records can be disclosed pursuant to the routine use exemption, without the consent
of the subject of the record, for agency purposes.35  The exemption for civil and
CRS-8
35 (...continued)
agency has requested information relevant or necessary for the hiring or retention of an
individual, or issuance of a security clearance, license, contract, grant, or other benefit. (6)
to the news media . . . . (7) to the Department of State, or other Federal agencies concerned
with visas and immigration, and to agencies in the Intelligence Community, to further those
agencies’ efforts with respect to persons who may pose a risk to transportation or national
security; a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety; or a threat
to aviation safety, civil aviation, or national security. (8) to international and foreign
governmental authorities in accordance with law and . . international agreements. (9) in
proceedings before any court, administrative, adjudicative, or tribunal body before which
TSA appears, . . . provided, however, that in each case, TSA determines that disclosure of
the records in the proceeding is a use of the information contained in the records that is
compatible with the purpose for which the records were collected. (10) to airports and
aircraft operators . . .. (11) to the National Archives and Records Administration . . . .  68
Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 15, 2003).
36 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7).
37 P.L. 100-503, 5 U.S.C. § 552a note.
38 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(8)(B)(vi).
39 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.  See CRS Report RL31482, The Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974: Recent Developments in the Law.
40 P.L. 107-56, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(j).  See CRS Report RL31377: The USA PATRIOT Act:
A Legal Analysis. 
criminal law enforcement activities permits the disclosure of personal information
for legally authorized activities.36  This exemption would allow the disclosure of
information to an intelligence agency for the prevention of terrorist acts.  The
exemption for foreign counterintelligence in the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1988,37 which amended the Privacy Act, legitimizes information
sharing through data matching among agencies for national security purposes.38
Agencies are required to make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an
individual when any record on such individual is made available to any person under
compulsory legal process when such process becomes a matter of public record.
Education Information.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974. FERPA
governs access to and disclosure of personally identifiable information in educational
records held by federally funded educational institutions and agencies.39  Disclosure
requires prior consent of the student’s parents unless done pursuant to federal grand
jury subpoena, administrative subpoena, or court order for law enforcement purposes.
Upon good cause shown, the court shall order that the existence or contents of a
subpoena or the information furnished not be disclosed.  The USA PATRIOT Act of
2001 amended FERPA to authorize the Justice Department to obtain a court order to
collect education records relevant to a terrorism-related offense or an act of domestic
or international terrorism.40  The order can only be issued if a court finds that the
records are relevant to a terrorism investigation.  The amendment also protects
educational institutions from liability for complying with such order.
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42 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
43 47 U.S.C. § 222.  See CRS Report RL30671, Personal Privacy Protection: The
Legislative Response.
Telecommunications Information.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.  Limits the disclosure
of cable television subscriber names, addresses, and utilization information.41  Cable
companies are prohibited from disclosing personally identifiable information
concerning a cable subscriber to the government except pursuant to a court order.
The order can only be issued if a court finds clear and convincing evidence that the
customer was suspected of engaging in a crime and that the information sought was
material evidence in the case; and the subject was afforded the opportunity to appear
and contest the government’s claim.  The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended the
Cable Act’s privacy provision to clarify that it applies only to information about a
customer’s cable TV service, but not to information about a customer who receives
Internet or telephone service from a cable provider.  When the government is
requesting information about a customer receiving Internet or telephone service from
a cable provider, the federal electronic surveillance statutes apply.
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988.  Regulates the treatment of
personally identifiable information collected in connection with video sales and
rentals.42  The Act prohibits videotape service providers from disclosing their
customers’ names, addresses, and specific videotapes rented or purchased except
pursuant to customer consent, or pursuant to a federal or state search warrant, grand
jury subpoena, or court order issued to a law enforcement agency.  The order can only
be issued if a court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the records or
other information sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.
Issuance of court orders requires prior notice to the customer. A court may quash or
modify such order if the information or records requested are unreasonably
voluminous or if compliance would cause an unreasonable burden on the provider.
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Limits the use and disclosure of
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) by telecommunications service
providers.43  The statute does not include specific provisions for the disclosure of
CPNI to law enforcement or government officials.  Except as required by law or with
customer consent, a telecommunications carrier must only use, disclose, or permit
access to individually identifiable customer proprietary network information in
providing the telecommunications service. Upon customer request, a
telecommunications carrier may disclose that customer’s proprietary network
information to any person designated by the customer. Customer proprietary network
information is information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type,
destination, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any
customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier
by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship, and includes
information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or
telephone toll service, but does not include subscriber list information.
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Health Information.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
HIPAA required publication of a medical privacy rule by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) in the absence of a congressional enactment.44  The final
privacy rule, “Standards for the Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information,” was published in December 2000 and modified in August 2002.45
Enforcement of the rule goes into effect for the majority of covered entities April
2003. The rule establishes privacy protections for individually identifiable health
information held by health care providers, health care plans, and health care
clearinghouses.  It establishes a series of regulatory permissions for uses and
disclosures of individually identifiable health information.46  Individually identifiable
health information is health information created or received by a covered entity
(health care provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse) that relates to past,
present, or future physical or mental health or a condition of an individual; the
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for
the provision of health care to an individual; and identifies the individual or  there is
a reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify the
individual.  The rule excludes education records covered by FERPA, and
employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer.
The medical privacy rule establishes new procedures and safeguards to restrict
the circumstances under which a covered entity may give such information to law
enforcement officers.  For example, the rule limits the type of information that
covered entities may disclose to law enforcement, absent a warrant or other prior
process, when law enforcement is seeking to identify or locate a suspect. It
specifically prohibits disclosure of DNA information for this purpose, absent some
other legal requirements such as a warrant. Where state law imposes additional
restrictions on disclosure of health information to law enforcement, those state laws
continue to apply. This rule sets a national floor of legal protections.  In those
circumstances when disclosure to law enforcement is permitted by the rule, the
privacy rule does not require covered entities to disclose any information. In the
event that some other federal or state law  requires a disclosure, the privacy rule does
not interfere with the operation of those other laws. However, unless the disclosure
is required by some other law, covered entities are to use their professional judgment
to decide whether to disclose information.
For law enforcement purposes the rule permits disclosure without consent or
authorization pursuant to process, and as otherwise required by law.47  A covered
entity may disclose protected health information as required by law;48 or in
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compliance with the requirements of (i) a court order or court-ordered warrant, a
judicial subpoena or summons, (ii) a grand jury subpoena, or (iii) an administrative
request, including an administrative subpoena or summons, a civil or authorized
investigative demand, or similar process authorized under law, provided that the
information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry;
the request is specific and limited in scope; and de-identified information could not
reasonably be used.  Covered entities are also permitted to disclose protected health
information in the course of judicial and administrative proceedings, and limited
information for identification purposes.  They are also permitted to disclose
information to a law enforcement official about an individual who has died if there
is reason to believe the death may have resulted form criminal conduct.  A covered
entity may disclose protected health information to authorized federal officials for the
conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security
activities authorized by the National Security Act and implementing authority.49
Motor Vehicle Information.
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994.  Regulates the use and disclosure
of personal information from state motor vehicle records.50  Personal information is
defined as information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s
photograph, Social Security number, driver identification number, name, address,
telephone number, and medical or disability information, but does not include
information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status.  Personal
information contained in a motor vehicle record may be disclosed for use by any
government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out
its functions, or to any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State,
or local agency; and for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or
arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-
regulatory body, or pursuant to a Federal, State, or local court order. 
Communications and Communications Records.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
The federal wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping statute permits federal and
state law enforcement officers to use wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under
strict limitations.51 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.  The federal and state courts may issue
interception orders upon applications approved by senior Justice Department or state
prosecutors.  The applications must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the
proposed interceptions will result in the capture of evidence of one or more of
statutorily designated crimes.  The orders are crafted to minimize the capture of
innocent conversations.  Officers may share information secured under the orders
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with other law enforcement or with intelligence officials in connection with the
performance of their official duties.  Senior Justice Department and state prosecutors
may authorize emergency interceptions for 48 hours while an application for a court
order is being prepared and presented.  Unless postponed by the court for cause, the
targets and anyone whose conversations have been captured are entitled to
notification within 90 days of the expiration of the order.  There are criminal, civil,
and administrative sanctions for illegal interception, and evidence secured through
an unlawful interception may be declared inadmissible in subsequent judicial or
administrative proceedings.  See table on “Laws Relating to Federal Government
Access to Information Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal Wiretap
Statute, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.”
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.  FISA governs the
use of wiretapping to collect “foreign intelligence” which is defined as “information
relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist
activities.”52  50 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq.  The eleven judges of a special court, whose
members are assigned from the federal bench, may authorize surveillance upon
applications approved by the Attorney General asserting probable cause to belief that
the effort will yield foreign intelligence.  FISA court surveillance orders are crafted
to minimize the capture of conversations not related to foreign intelligence.  Officers
may share the results with law enforcement officials for the performance of their
duties.  The Attorney General may authorize emergency surveillance for 72 hours
while a FISA order is being secured.  The President may authorize surveillance
without a court order during time of war or for communications between or among
foreign powers.  If the government intends to use the results as evidence in judicial
proceedings it must inform the parties to the intercepted conversations.  Challenges
to the legality of the surveillance may be considered ex parte upon petition of the
Attorney General.  Unlawful surveillance is subject to criminal, civil, and
administrative sanctions, and evidence illegally secured may be suppressed.
FISA also empowered judges of the FISA court to issue physical search orders
under limitations similar to FISA surveillance orders.  In foreign intelligence cases,
FISA likewise tracks the procedure used in criminal cases for  the installation and use
of pen register and trap and trace devices under court order.   Finally, it called for
FISA orders for the production of tangible items in foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations.  See table on “Laws Relating to Federal
Government Access to Information Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal
Wiretap Statute, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.  ECPA amended
and augmented Title III.  It regulates government access to ongoing and stored wire
and electronic communications (such as voice mail or electronic mail), transactional
records access, and the use of pen registers, and trap and trace devices.53  After its
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modifications the surreptitious capture of e-mails and other electronic
communications in transit enjoy the coverage of Title III and may be accomplished
under a Title III court order.  When voice mail, e-mails and other electronic
communications have been in storage for less than 180 days, they can be seized under
a search warrant based on probable cause.  Those in storage for 180 days or more can
be secured under a court order upon a showing of relevancy and materiality, under
a subpoena, or under a search warrant.  
ECPA also authorized court orders for the installation and use of pen registers
as well as trap and trace devices, which identify source and address of
communications, but not the contents of the conversation.  These orders may be
issued on the basis of relevancy to a criminal investigation and their results need not
be disclosed to the individuals whose communications are their targets.  Perhaps
because in the case of Internet communications header information is more revealing
than the mere identification of source and addressee telephone numbers, results of
such orders must be reported to the issuing court under seal.  
Finally, ECPA established a procedure for government access to the customer
records of telephone company or other communications service providers.  Here too,
access may be had by search warrant, subpoena, or court order (on a showing of
relevancy).   See “Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to Information
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal Wiretap Statute, and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.”
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  The Act substantively amended Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.54  The USA
PATRIOT Act authorized the disclosure of wiretap and grand jury information to
“any federal, law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national
defense, or national security official” for the performance of his duties.55  It permitted
use of FISA surveillance orders when foreign intelligence gathering is “a significant”
reason for the order rather than “the” reason.  It brought e-mail and other forms of
electronic communications within the pen register and trap and trace procedures
under both ECPA and FISA.  Finally, it authorized FISA  orders for access to any
tangible item rather than only business records held by lodging, car rental, and locker
rental businesses.  See table on “Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to
Information Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal Wiretap Statute, and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.”
The Homeland Security Act of 2002.  The Act amended Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the Electronic Communications
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Privacy Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197856 to authorize
sharing the results of the federal government’s information gathering efforts under
those statutes with relevant foreign, state and local officials.  See table on “Laws
Relating to Federal Government Access to Information Pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment, the Federal Wiretap Statute, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.”
Financial Information.  This section provides a description of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
The  table appended to this report on “Laws Relating to Federal Government Access
to Personal Financial Information” also includes the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, the
U.S.A. Patriot Act provisions related to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), and relevant provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970. FCRA sets forth rights for
individuals and responsibilities for consumer “credit reporting agencies” in
connection with the preparation and dissemination of personal information in a
consumer report.  Under the FCRA, consumer reporting agencies are prohibited from
disclosing consumer reports to anyone who does not have a permissible purpose.57
FCRA covers information gathered by consumer reporting agencies on consumers
to evaluate qualifications for credit, employment, insurance, and other transactions;
covered information may include identifying (name, address, employer and former
address and employer), credit (transactions, etc.), and public record information as
well as information on entities seeking credit reports on the consumer. A limited
amount of identifying information from a credit bureau’s file on a consumer (i.e.,
“header information”  – name, address, employment and previous address) may be
disclosed upon request.  No notice is required.  Consumer reports and any other
information in a consumer’s file can be disclosed pursuant to a court order or grand
jury subpoena; or in connection with the application for a license or for determining
eligibility for a government benefit or license. The FBI, for foreign
counterintelligence  investigative purposes, may obtain names and addresses of
financial institutions at which consumers maintain or have maintained accounts,
provided the request is signed by an appropriate official who has certified that the
investigation is not conducted solely on the basis of activity protected under the First
Amendment.  The USA PATRIOT Act amended the FCRA to authorize the
disclosure of consumer reports and any other information in a consumer’s file upon
request in writing from any government agency authorized  to conduct international
terrorism investigations, or  intelligence or counterintelligence activities related
thereto, stating that such information is necessary for the agency’s conduct of that
activity and signed by an appropriate supervisor.  No notice is required. See table on
“Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to Personal Financial Information.”
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The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.  The RFPA was enacted in
response to the 1976 decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller,58
which ruled that individuals have no Fourth Amendment “expectation of privacy” in
records maintained by their banks.  The RFPA sets forth procedures for the federal
government’s access to financial institution customer records.59  RFPA covers the
records of individuals who are customers of banks, thrifts, credit unions, credit card
issuers, and consumer finance companies.  The Act requires the government to
present administrative subpoenas or summons based upon reason to believe the
information is relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.  In criminal
investigations, judicial search warrants based on probable cause must be obtained.
Notice to the customer is required except upon issuance of a court order finding the
existence of certain exigent circumstances.  However, these restrictions do not apply
to foreign intelligence activities and investigations related to international terrorism.60
See  “Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to Personal Financial
Information.”
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.  Requires financial institutions to
disclose their privacy policies to their customers.61  Title V of the Act regulates non-
publically available personally identifiable customer (or applicant) information held
by “financial institutions,” a term that is broadly defined to include anyone in the
business of providing services that are financial in nature, including banking,
securities, insurance, accounting, tax preparation, asset management, real estate
leasing and settlement services.  GLBA provides exceptions for law enforcement to
the law’s general prohibition against  “financial institution” sharing of personally
identifiable customer information with non-affiliated third parties.  Exceptions permit
sharing of such information in response to judicial process; as permitted or required
under other provisions of law, and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy
Act; and to provide information to law enforcement agencies, or for an investigation
on a matter of public safety. No notice of disclosure to the customer is necessary,
except as required pursuant to other law.  See table on “Laws Relating to Federal
Government Access to Personal Financial Information.”
Other Information.
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998.  Requires website
operators and online service providers to obtain parental consent to collect a child’s
personal information, and requires sites collecting information from children to
disclose how they plan to use the data.62  Parental consent is not required for the
operator of such a website or online service to collect, use, or disclose such
information to respond to judicial process; or to provide information, to the extent
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permitted under other laws,  to law enforcement agencies or for an investigation on
a matter related to public safety.63
Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations.  Revised
guidelines were issued by Attorney General Ashcroft in May 2002 which removed
prohibitions on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of publicly-available
sources of information – e.g., libraries or the Internet– except as part of an
investigation.  The 2002 guidelines authorize the FBI to engage in general topical
research, which includes conducting online searches and accessing online sites and
forums on the same terms and conditions as members of the public. This will allow
the FBI to examine public records, monitor the Internet, survey periodicals and
newspapers and commercial databases (like Google or Experian) – not incident to a
criminal investigation.64
Miscellaneous Provisions.  Numerous federal statutes include provisions
that regulate the use and disclosure of certain types of information held by the
government.  For example, the confidentiality and disclosure of tax returns and return
information is governed by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code,65 the
disclosure of Census data is governed, in part, by 13 U.S.C. § 9 which prohibits the
use, publication, or examination of any information collected by the Census Bureau,
other than for the statistical purpose for which the information was supplied; records
pertaining to the issuance or refusal of visas to enter the United States are governed
by 8 U.S.C. 1202(f); release of passport information in passport files is subject to the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and handled in
accordance with the regulations in 22 CFR Part 171 and 172.
Legal Requirements for Warrants, Subpoenas, Court Orders,
and Requests
Federal statutes that limit access to records held by third parties often specify
the process that the federal government must use to gain access to these records.
While the TIA program appears to envision real-time access, if not concurrent access,
none of the means currently available to the government for accessing data appear to
afford such an open-ended virtual appropriation of databases, either public or private.
Leaving aside the question of whether there is sufficient authority for TIA’s
continuous monitoring of databases, what follows is a description of common tools
available to the government to gain access to information.
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Law enforcement officials who seek access to information in records held by
third-party custodians have several procedural alternatives that include warrants,
grand jury subpoenas, administrative subpoenas, court orders, written requests and
oral requests.  The complexity of the legal requirements for obtaining warrants,
subpoenas, and court orders may be such that TIA would opt for other more
expedient avenues of access.66
The term “warrant” ordinarily refers to a court document, issued by a judge or
magistrate pursuant to the demands of the Fourth Amendment, upon the request of
a law enforcement officer and without affording other parties an opportunity to object
to the issuance or execution of the warrant.  A search warrant authorizes a search for
evidence in connection with a criminal investigation.  Officers seeking a warrant
must present sworn statements establishing probable cause to believe that the
requested search will result in the discovery of evidence of a crime.67  After the fact,
a property owner is entitled to notice that a search has occurred and to an inventory
of any property seized.68  Notice is limited to those who have a reasonable
expectation of privacy and under some circumstances this will not include records
concerning an individual in a third party’s computerized records whose claim to
confidentiality has been weakened by making them available to others.69
Grand jury subpoena – In the context of its investigation of potential
corruption or crime, usually at the request of the prosecuting attorney, the grand jury
will issue a subpoena duces tecum – if documents are requested – requiring the
record custodian’s appearance with the requested documents or records.  When
subpoena duces tecum are served on record custodians, the government is usually
under no obligation to bring the subpoena to the attention of the subject, but the
custodian is usually free to do so.
Administrative subpoena – In the context of a civil investigation, an agency
pursuant to its statutory authority and in accordance with its rules, may issue a
request for information or production of documents, reasonably related to a matter
within the jurisdiction of the agency.  Generally the subpoena may be challenged in
court based  on lack of relevance, breadth, or lack of particularity.  Often there is no
requirement that the subject of the records be notified of the government’s request.
Court orders – Generally, parties to litigation have the prerogative of seeking
the assistance of the court, through the issuance of an order to produce documents or
records or information, to facilitate the discovery process in litigation.  In the context
of government access to the kinds of information that might be desired for TIA
programs two types pf specific court orders, the standards for which are outlined in
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statutes, are particularly relevant: (1) a court ordered electronic surveillance order
under the federal wiretap statute, and (2) a surveillance order under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  The first may be issued by any federal court,
provided the statutory procedures are complied with, including approval by senior
federal officials.  The second may only be issued by the FISA court.  The suspicion
threshold varies according to the situation.  For example, the federal wiretap statute
uses a “probable cause plus” standard,70 while the court order authorizing installation
of a pen register and trap and trace device calls for a finding that the “investigative
officer has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”71 The breadth
of access varies from statute to statute as well.  Often, the standard of suspicion
required for issuance of the order coupled with the type of information sought will
define the range of access.  In some instances, however, Congress has imposed
further limitations.  Under the federal wiretap statute, for instance, the authority
under the court order terminates as soon as the objectives for which the order was
sought have been realized.72  As noted above, “court order” statutes sometimes limit
the manner in which officers may use or disclose such evidence.  A few statutes
expect court orders to be issued following an adversarial hearing;73 in others the
subject of the records receives notice only after the fact;74 and in still others there are
special provisions for extended postponement of notice under some circumstances.75
The statute that creates the special court order procedure may indicate the grounds
and procedure, if any, under which the subject of a record may seek to bar law
enforcement access or use.  Some may require prior notice.76  Where the order is
issued and access granted prior to notice, the subject may be limited to the exclusion
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of evidence or civil remedies to the extent that the application, order, execution of
the order, or use of the information fail to meet the requirements of the statute.77
An oral or written request may procure access based on the consent of the
third party information custodian.  Issuance of such a request would depend upon the
rules and procedures governing the operations of the agent making the request.
Congressional Response
The 108th Congress is likely to reexamine existing federal law in terms of
barriers to government access to information necessary to prevent and respond to acts
of terrorism; while at the same time insuring that information is maintained in a
manner that insures its most effective use, protects against its loss, against
inappropriate use or disclosure; ensures public and Congressional scrutiny as a form
of checks and balances; and otherwise guarantees individual privacy consistent with
the Constitution.
According to Senator Shelby of the Senate Intelligence Committee, “[h]ow
broadly it [TIA] will ultimately be used is a matter for policymakers to decide if and
when the program bears fruit.”78  On January 13, 2003 Senator Harkin requested that
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hold  hearings on the Total Information
Awareness (TIA) project.  On January 16, 2003, Senator Russ Feingold  introduced
S. 188, the Data-mining Moratorium Act, which would limit the use of data mining
technology by the Defense Department and by the new Department of Homeland
Security without Congressional approval and appropriate civil liberties protections.
On January 23, 2003 the Senate passed amendment S.Amdt. 59 (introduced by
Senator Wyden) to H.J.Res. 2, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
imposing limitations on implementation of Total Information Awareness programs,
and requiring a detailed report to Congress.  Both the House and Senate approved the
FY03 omnibus spending bill, H.J.Res. 2, on February 13, 2003 (P.L. 108-7).  It
includes in section 111, with slight modifications, the language from S.Amdt 59
regarding the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.
The bill allows the Administration, 90 days after the bill is enacted to submit a report
to Congress on the TIA program, instead of 60 days as proposed by the Senate. The
provision has also been modified to clarify that the TIA program may be deployed
in the United States to assist in the conduct of lawful U.S. foreign intelligence
activities against non-United States persons.
Section 111, Limitation on Use of Funds for Research and Development on
Total Information Awareness Program, of H. J. Res. 2 imposes limitations on the use
of funds for Total Information Awareness programs.  It expresses the sense of
Congress that the program should not be used to develop technologies for use in
conducting intelligence activities or law enforcement activities against United States
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persons without appropriate consultation with Congress, or without clear adherence
to principles to protect civil liberties and privacy. It reiterates the primary DOD focus
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.  The amendment provides that
no funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or to any other department, agency,
or element of the Federal Government may be obligated or expended on research and
development on the Total Information Awareness program unless a written report,
prepared by the  Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of
Central Intelligence, is submitted to Congress within 90 days after passage of the
omnibus spending bill; or the President certifies to Congress in writing that
submission of the report to Congress within 90 days is not practicable, and that the
cessation of research and development on the Total Information Awareness program
would endanger the national security of the United States.
The report to Congress must include a detailed explanation for each project and
activity of the Total Information Awareness program – the actual and intended use
of funds; the schedule for proposed research and development; and target dates for
deployment.  It must assess the likely efficacy of systems such as the Total
Information Awareness program; the likely impact of the implementation of the Total
Information Awareness program on privacy and civil liberties; and provide a list of
the laws and regulations that govern the information to be collected by the Total
Information Awareness program, and a description of any modifications required to
use the information in the manner proposed.  The report must include the Attorney
General’s recommendations for practices, procedures, regulations, or legislation on
the deployment, implementation, or use of the Total Information Awareness program
to eliminate or minimize adverse affects on privacy and civil liberties. 
The amendment prohibits the deployment, implementation, or transfer  of the
TIA program or a component thereof to any department, agency, or element of the
federal government until the Secretary of Defense notifies Congress; and receives
from Congress specific authorization for the deployment and a specific appropriation
of funds.  This limitation does not apply with respect to the deployment or
implementation of the Total Information Awareness program, or a component of
such program, in support of the lawful military operations of the United States
conducted outside the United States, and in support of lawful foreign intelligence
activities conducted wholly against non-United States persons.
Another issue that has arisen is whether the Homeland Security Act of 2002
authorizes TIA programs in the newly created Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).  Although the Homeland Security Act does not expressly authorize Total
Information Awareness programs, Congress authorized $500 million for a DHS
entity with a name similar to DARPA, Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA).  The new law also includes language that authorizes the
utilization of data mining and other advanced analytical tools by the new
department.79
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Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to Personal Financial Information80
Statutory Provision Information Sought Process Notice Requirement
Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801et
seq.
Non-publically available personally
identifiable customer (or applicant)
information held by “financial
institutions,” a term that is broadly
defined to include anyone in the
business of providing services that
are financial in nature, including
banking, securities, insurance,
accounting, tax preparation, asset
management, real estate leasing and
settlement services.
Provides exceptions for law
enforcement to the legislation’s
general prohibition against 
“financial institution” sharing of
personally identifiable customer
information with non-affiliated third
parties.  Exceptions permit sharing of
such information: (1) in response to
judicial process; (2) as permitted or
required under other provisions of
law, and in accordance with the Right
to Financial Privacy Act; and (3)   to
provide information to law
enforcement agencies, or for an
investigation on a matter of public
safety.
No notice–except pursuant to other
law, such as the Right to Financial
Privacy Act.
Right to Financial Privacy Act – 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq.
Records of individuals who are
customers of banks, thrifts, credit
unions, credit card issuers, and
consumer finance companies.
Administrative subpoena or
summons–upon reason to believe
information is relevant to a legitimate
law enforcement inquiry.
Notice required–except upon court
order finding the existence of certain
exigent circumstances.
“ “ Customer authorization–which must
be specific and is limited to a 3-
month period.
NA
“ “ Search warrant upon probable cause
issued by a judicial officer
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The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12
U.S.C. §§  1829b and 1951-1959, and
31 U.S.C.  5311-5322, and its major
component, the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (the anti-
money laundering laws). Title III of
the USA PATRIOT Act included
various amendments to this
legislation.
Reports and records of cash,
negotiable instrument, and foreign
currency transactions of “financial
institutions,” a term that is defined
broadly to include banks, thrifts,
credit unions, securities dealers,
credit card companies, insurance
companies, jewelers, pawnbrokers,
travel agencies, loan companies,
telegraph companies, money
transmitting businesses, and any
other business designated by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
Threshold for reporting currency or
foreign transactions is $10,000;
geographic targeting orders may be
issued lowering that threshold
considerably for a limited area and
time.
The Secretary of the Treasury may
prescribe regulations to insure that
adequate records are maintained of
transactions that have a “high degree
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or
proceedings.” 12 U.S.C. § 1829b. 
These records may be subpoenaed. 
Institutions must develop anti-money
laundering programs.   Banks, thrifts,
and credit unions; money service
businesses (including informal
networks such as hawalas); casinos
and card clubs;  and securities firms
must file suspicious activities reports
(SAR’s).
No notice.
USA-PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. §
310.  Statutory authority for the
Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN).
This is a government-wide data
access service to identify possible
criminal activity, support
investigations, identify potential
violations of the anti-money
laundering laws, determine emerging
trends in money laundering and
financial crimes, support intelligence
or counter intelligence initiatives,
and furnish law enforcement
authorities with information to aid in
detecting and preventing terrorism,
FinCEN collects data reported under
the anti-money laundering laws;
currency flow information; records
and data maintained by federal, state,
local and foreign agencies; and other
privately and publicly available
information.  It analyzes this
information and disseminates the
results and supports and fosters 
federal and international efforts
against financial crimes.   
No notice.
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financial crimes, and other criminal
activity.
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq.
Information gathered by consumer
reporting agencies on consumers to
evaluate qualifications for credit,
employment, insurance, other
transactions; may include identifying
(name, address, employer and former
address and employer), credit
(transactions, etc.), and public record
information as well as information on
entities seeking credit reports on the
consumer.
Limited amount of information from
credit bureau’s file on a
consumer–i.e., “header information,”
identifying information–name,
address, employment and previous
address and employment to a
government agency.
Upon request. No notice.
Fair Credit Reporting Act,  15 U.S.C.
§ 1681v.
Consumer reports and any other
information in a consumer’s file.
Pursuant to a court order or grand
jury subpoena.
In connection with the application for
a license or for determining
eligibility for a government benefit
or license. 
One court has ruled that the Federal
Trade Commission, as the 
enforcement agency for the
legislation, may cause a consumer
reporting agency to produce its
complete files on a consumer or
consumers pursuant to an agency
subpoena.  FTC v. Manager, Retail
CRS-24
Statutory Provision Information Sought Process Notice Requirement
Credit Co., 515 F. 2d 988 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
The FBI, for foreign
counterintelligence  investigative
purposes,  may obtain names and
addresses of financial institutions at
which consumers maintain or have
maintained accounts, provided the
request is signed by appropriate
official who has certified that the
investigation is not conducted solely
on the basis of activity protected
under the First Amendment.   
Fair Credit Reporting Act, as
amended by the USA PATRIOT,
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681v.
Consumer reports and any other
information in a consumer’s file.
Upon request in writing from any
government agency authorized  to
conduct international terrorism
investigations, or  intelligence or
counterintelligence activities related
thereto, stating that such information
is necessary for the agency’s conduct
of that activity and signed by an
appropriate supervisor.
No notice.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, as amended
by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, 26
U.S.C. §§ 7602, 7609, and 7610.
Confidential records of individuals
and other legal entities that are held
by financial institutions, and other
third-party record keepers, e.g.,
lawyers, accountants, consumer
reporting agencies, accountants, and
credit card issuers.
Internal Revenue Service summons. Notice is required and must be
followed by a waiting period during
which the persons whose records are
requested  may challenge the
summons in court.
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Laws Relating to Federal Government Access to Information Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, the Federal
Wiretap Statute, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act81
Applicable Law Coverage Purpose for Access Process Notice
Requirement
Fourth Amendment: Information and data in
which the target of the




of privacy (i.e., one that




Seeking evidence of a
crime.
Judicial search warrant issued upon probable cause. Contemporaneous
notice of seizure.






Fourth Amendment warrant, probable cause, and














(not involving a U.S.




FISA court or magistrate order for access, following an
FBI supervisor-approved application specifying the














longer needs to be sole




FISA court order issued upon application approved by
the Attorney General showing  probable cause to believe
that target is a foreign power or agent and owner of the
searched property.
Process is subject to standards designed to minimize
unnecessary intrusions into matters of  U.S. persons and
to limits on duration of the order.  Legality of seizures
under this process is to be tested in an ex parte
proceeding; evidence obtained through this process may
be shared with law enforcement authorities investigating
criminal activity.
Emergency orders may be issued by the Attorney
General, which must be approved by the FISA court to
which application must be made within 72 hours.  If
there is no FISA court approval, results  may be used
only with the Attorney General’s approval and only in
cases involving a threat of death or serious bodily injury.
U.S. persons may not to targeted based solely on their


















which it will use it.
Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of










Presidential directive through the Attorney General for
searches without a court order for up to one year. 
Certification of minimization procedures sent under seal





1978, 50 U.S.C. 
Physical searches. Seeking tangible or
intangible items for
foreign intelligence
The President may order a physical search for up to 15




Applicable Law Coverage Purpose for Access Process NoticeRequirement






wire or radio facilities.
Seeking foreign
intelligence information
(no longer need to sole




FISA court order issued upon application approved by
the Attorney General showing  probable cause to believe
that target is a foreign power or agent.
Process is subject to standards designed to minimize
unnecessary intrusions into matters of  U.S. persons and
to limits on duration of the order.  Legality of
surveillance under this process is to be tested in an ex
parte proceeding; evidence obtained through this process
may be shared with law enforcement authorities
investigating criminal activity.
Emergency orders may be issued by the Attorney
General, which must be approved by the FISA court to
which application must be made within 72 hours.  If
there is no FISA court approval, results  may be used
only with the Attorney General’s approval and only in
cases involving a threat of death or serious bodily injury.
U.S. persons may not be targeted based solely on their


















which it will use it.
Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of
1978, 50 U.S.C. 
1811.
Communications using




purposes in time of war.
The President may order surveillance for up to 15 days















Presidential directive through the Attorney General for
surveillance without a court order for up to one year. 
Certification of minimization procedures sent under seal








Wire (phone), oral (face
to face), or electronic
(nonverbal) surveillance
(conversations captured
by machine or device). 
Seeking evidence of a
crime.
Consent of one party to the communication. No notice required.
18 U.S.C. 2510-
2522 (Title III).  
Wire (phone), oral (face
to face), or electronic
(nonverbal) surveillance
(conversations captured
by machine or device.
Seeking evidence of a
crime.
Federal or state court order issued on application
approved by senior prosecutorial authorities showing
probable cause pertaining to a limited list of predicate
offenses.
Process is subject to standards designed minimize the
capture of unrelated (not crime related) conversations. 
Legality of surveillance under this process is tested in
suppression hearings if the government seeks to use the
resulted in a judicial or administrative proceeding;
evidence may be shared with law enforcement or
intelligence authorities for the performance of their
duties.
Emergency orders may be issued by senior prosecutorial
authorities, which must be approved by the court to
which applications must be made within 48 hours.  If






















in storage less than 180
days.
Seeking evidence of a
crime.





18 U.S.C. 2701- Wire and electronic Seeking evidence of a Search warrant issued upon probable cause; court order Court may bar
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2711(relating to
communications
records and  stored
communications).  
communications content
in storage more than
180 days.
crime. upon relevancy and materiality; or grand jury, trial, or













Seeking evidence of a
crime.
Search warrant issued upon probable cause; court order
upon relevancy and materiality; or grand jury, trial, or

















terrorism or foreign spy
investigations.
Written request from senior FBI officials certifying
relevancy.













Seeking evidence of a
crime.
With customer consent; for service related or service
provider protection purposes; threat of serious injury;
evidence of crime inadvertently discovered by service
provider (content only); written request concerning














Seeking evidence of a
crime.
Court order for the installation and use of pen register
and/or trap and trace devices on the basis of relevancy
for 60 days (renewable).
The results in cases involving the Internet must be
reported to the court under seal after termination.
 
Senior Justice Department officials may approve






Applicable Law Coverage Purpose for Access Process NoticeRequirement
application for a court order) in the face of threats of
serious injury, or in organized crime cases, national












FISA court order for the installation and use of pen
register and/or trap and trace devices on the basis of
relevancy for 90 days (renewable).
The Attorney General may approve emergency
installation and use (for 48 hours pending the application
for a court order).
 U.S. persons may not to targeted based solely on their
exercise of 1st Amendment rights.
Process is subject to standards designed to minimize
unnecessary intrusions into maters of  U.S. persons and
to limits on duration of the order.  Legality of this
process is to be tested in an ex parte proceeding;
evidence obtained through this process may be shared




















terrorism or foreign spy
investigations.
The President may order installation and use of a pen
register and/or a trap and trace device for up to 15 days
during a time of declared war.
No statutory
requirement.
